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1. Introduction
The present unfunded pay-as-you-go system in Slovakia covers old-age re-
tirement, disability and survival pensions. Thesystem has generated deficits
mainly because of high unemployment and low contributions paid on behalf
of the unemployed by the government, and high contribution evasion, since
1997. Thenegative demographic development is another reason why thesys-
tem is not sustainable (Thomay, 2002), (Golia‰, 2003). Evasions are explained
by insufficient property rights to the pension savings, low linkage between
contributions and benefits, and increased migration of the labor force.
In April 2003 the government passed the Principles of the Pension Reform
in the Slovak Republic. The goals of the pension reform were to secure a sta-
ble flow of high pensions to the beneficiaries, and sustainability and overall
stability of the system. Corresponding legislation, as passed in December
2003, establishes a system based on three pillars:
1. mandatory, non-funded 1st (pay-as-you-go) pillar,
2. mandatory, fully funded 2nd pillar,
3. voluntary, fully funded 3rd pillar.
The contribution rates for the 1st pillar were set at 19.75 % (old age 9 %,
disability and survival 6 % and reserve fund 4.75 %) and 9 % for the 2nd pil-
lar. The total rate is about 0.75 % higher than the old one.
The new system is obligatory for those entering the labor market, and op-
tional for existing contributors of below the age of 521, who would therefore
loose theoption to return to theold system, but would keep benefits acquired
in the old system (they will receive full pension for the years that they par-
ticipated in the old system, and half a pension corresponding to their par-
ticipation in the new system). The retirement age was set at 62 for both 
sexes, and will increase by 9 months every year2. Compared to Poland and
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1 Given the retirement age of 62 and a condition to save at least for ten years in the 2nd pillar.Hungary, the Slovak 2nd pillar is more substantial. Contribution rates are
higher in Slovakia – compared to 7.3 % in Poland and 6 % (with possible fu-
ture increase to 8 %) in Hungary3.
The transitory financial gap in the 1st pillar, due to the introduction of
the 2nd pillar (contributions to the 1st pillar will decrease by the amount paid
to the 2nd pillar, while the participants of the old system continue receiving
their pensions purely from the1stpillar) will be covered from public resources
(e.g. from privatization). In the next section we estimate the total amount
of necessary public coverage. In the third section we estimate the level of
old-age pensions in the new system.
2. Balance of the Pay-as-you-go Pillar
Rough calculations of the balance of the 1st pillar (neglecting e.g. disabi-
lity pensions, unemployment, actual number of old-age pensions) are provi-
ded by Thomay (2002), detailed calculations by Ministry of Labor, Social Af-
fairs and Family of the Slovak Republic and Patrick Wiese (mimeo). Agreat
inspiration for our estimations was a paper by Holzmann (1997), which also
dealt with the deficit caused by the launch of the second pillar. The calcu-
lations of thedeficit of theHungarian pension system could be found in (Pala-
cios – Rocha, 1998).
In the following we estimate costs of the Slovak pension system under va-
rious scenarios. We base our estimations on macroeconomic forecasts by Mar-
tin Barto and Juraj Kotian (see the table in the Annex). The estimated ba-
lance does not include any state contributions. We do not consider indexation
by wage growth because of considerable pressure on public finance.
The balance of the first pillar under no reform scenario (Figure 1) depends
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2 The current retirement age for man is 60 and for women 54, depending on number of her chil-
dren.
3 A through description of the pension reforms in Hungary and Poland could be found in (Pala-
cios – Rocha, 1998), (Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform, 1997),
(Benczúr, 1999), (Simonovits, 2000), (Chlon – Góra – Rutkowski, 1999) and (Fultz, 2002).
FIGURE 1 Balance of the Pay-as-you-go System (no reform)
year 20...
































Balance of the pay-as-you-go system – % GDP
(no reform)on a method of indexation of pensions. We consider three types of the in-
dexation: by nominal gross wage growth, by inflation, or by an average of
the two (Swiss indexation). All indexation methods lead to a considerable 
deficit, which is lower for indexation by inflation, than for indexation by
wage growth. This is because we assume positive real wage growth rate.
A primary reason of increased deficit is that the ratio of pensioners and
contributors is rising, while the contribution and the replacement rates are
fixed. The ratio of a number of men older than 60 to those 18–60 years old
and the ratio of a number of men older than 65 to those 18–65 years old (Fi-
gure 2) clearly indicates that the fiscal deficit could be significantly decreas-
ed by a higher retirement age. On average, a difference in a deficit between
a system of retirement age of 54-60 (women-man) and 65-65 is between 2 to
3%   of the GDP.
The effect of the retirement age on the fiscal deficit is evaluated in two
types of indexation. The deficit is higher for the Swiss indexation than for
theCPI indexation (Figure3), because we assume positive real wage growth.
393 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
FIGURE 2 Dependency for >60/18–60 and >65/18–65
Note: young, old and medium options of the demography evolution
Source: (INFOSTAT)
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year 20...
in %
Balance of the pay-as-you-go system – % GDP
(increasing the retirement age, Swiss indexation)
Balance of the pay-as-you-go system – % GDP
(increasing the retirement age, CPI indexation)Palacios and Rocha (1998) presented similar results for the Hungarian pen-
sion system.
An increased retirement age, especially in a country with high unem-
ployment, may further increase unemployment rate and fiscal costs. We have
estimated an increase in the unemployment rate under the assumption that
30 or 50 % of those who would, in the old system retire as 54–60 years old
(women-man) become unemployed in the new system (Table 1). Clearly, as
more people remain in the work force, an increase in unemployment rates
becomes more likely (from 0.1 % to 1.5 % if 30 % were unemployed, and from
0.4 % to 3.4 % if half were unemployed).
The balance of the 1st pillar seems not very sensitive to estimated changes
in unemployment rates (Figure 4): a 1% increase in unemployment rates
lowers the balance by roughly 0.1 % of the GDP.
The 2nd pillar will first create deficit pressures, because some contributors
switch their contributions from the 1st to the 2nd pillar. However, once pen-
sions will be paid from the 2nd pillar, expenditures of 1st pillar will decrease,
as those who switched will receive lower pensions from the 1st pillar (Fi-
gure 5). It is clear that the higher the level of contributions to the 2nd pillar,
the higher the initial deficit. However, later the deficit declines, because
fewer pensioners will collect pensions from only the 1st pillar.
Demographic evolution and the number of those who switch to the 2nd pil-
lar are other important determinants of the 1st pillar deficit. To estimate
the impact of demography, we consider a contribution ratio of 9/9, a retire-
ment age of 62 years, Swiss or CPI indexation, and three demographic sce-
narios: the young, medium and old options4. Each option has a different de-
pendence ratio5. The young option dependence ratio is the lowest (there are
less pensioners and more contributors) and the deficit is the lowest too (Fi-
gure 6).
According to the law, people older than 52 will remain in the old system.
It is difficult to assess now how many people will switch to the new system.
In general, we assume that young people will be more likely to switch than
older people. In our calculations we assume that all between the age of 18
and 25 years old will switch. Then the percentage of those who switch will
decline linearly, and only 5 % of 52 year olds switch. The sensitivity of
the 1st pillar deficit on the number of switchers is estimated by three sce-
narios of transition from the old to the new system: slow (30 % of all eligible
switch), medium (60 %) and fast (90 % – Figure 7).
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TABLE 1 Estimation of Increase in Unemployment Rates
Note: Under the assumption that 30 or 50 % of those, who would retire in the old system and would not find a job
in the new system.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
30 % 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.56 0.68 0.82 0.96 1.10 1.24 1.37 1.47
50 % 0.39 0.78 1.15 1.44 1.73 2.03 2.34 2.63 2.91 3.19 3.38
4 source of the three options: INFOSTAT
5 dependence ratio = total number of pensioners / total number of contributorsThe conclusion of our estimations is: the balance of the old one pillar sys-
tem will be significantly improved by a change of indexation, an increase in
retirement age and the introduction of the second pillar (Figure 8). Whereas
the change of indexation and the increase of the retirement age have an
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FIGURE 4 The Sensitivity of the 1st Pillar Balance to an Estimated Increase in Unemployment
Rates
FIGURE 5 The Impact of Introduction of the 2nd Pillar on the Deficit of the 1st Pillar
Note: Retirement age 62-62 or 65-65, Swiss or CPI indexation, and ratio of contributions between the1stand the2ndpil-
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Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
Sensitivity to the unemployment change








































































































































Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
(retirement age: 62-62, Swiss indexation)
Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
(retirement age: 65-65, Swiss indexation)
Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
(retirement age: 65-65, CPI indexation)
Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
(retirement age: 62-62, CPI indexation)immediate positive impact on the 1st pillar balance, the introduction of
the 2nd pillar will deteriorate the balance until 2044, and only then bring
positive results.
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FIGURE 6 Different Demographic Scenarios, Swiss and CPI Indexation
FIGURE 7 Different Scenarios of Transition, Swiss and CPI Indexation



































































Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
Different demography scenarios
(Swiss indexation)










































































Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP
Different variants of transition (Swiss indexation)
Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP



































Important steps of the reform
Balance of the pay-as-you-go pillar – % GDP3. The Level of Pensions Paid from the Second Pillar
There is extensive literature on the level of pensions, let us mention at
least (Bodie, 1994, 1996, 2001) and (Orszag – Stiglitz, 2001). Anovelty of our
approach is that we also consider the risk of asset returns.
The level of pension benefits is what pensioners care about. To measure
it, we calculate the ratio of nominal pensions to nominal gross wages.6 It
seems obvious that a retired person strives to replace wage with pension in
order to maintain his or her living standard. The reform of the current pay-
-as-you-go pillar7 brings three major innovations: an increase of the retire-
ment age to 62 for men and women, a new pension formula and Swiss in-
dexation of the pensions. According to the law, the initial monthly pension
from the 1st pillar is:
P=APWP . N . APV
where APV (Actual Pension Value) is set by the law at 183.58 to provide
a 50% replacement rate (average initial pension/average gross wage) in
the first year of the reform. The law assumes automatic annual valoriza-
tion of the APV by the nominal gross wage growth. The APWP (Average Per-
sonal Wage Point) represents the average of the ratio of the individual gross
wage to the average gross wage over a period of 1994 to the last year of em-
ployment. N stands for the number of years, in which pension contributions
were paid.
We assume anaverage gross wage in Slovakia in 2003 at Sk14,6868. Should
theinitial pension cover 50% of theaverage gross wage (i.e. Sk7,343), awork-
er would have to earn the national average wage (APWP = 1) for the last
40 years. Because the APV is indexed by the nominal gross wage growth,
the 50% replacement rate should be preserved.
Participants of the two-pillar system will receive full pensions for the time
they participated in the old system and half a pension for the time they par-
ticipate in the new system. Therefore, workers who participate in the two-
-pillar system will only achieve a 25% replacement rate. Rights acquired in
the old system are recognized differently by different countries: for example
in Hungary, theaccrual rates of thenew first pillar recognize all rights earn-
ed under the old system. These rates are the same for all who switch and
therefore anyone who switches is effectively forfeiting a part of his/her ac-
quired rights. This grants the government a certain measure of control over
the speed of the transition.
Old-age pensions are annually indexed by the average of nominal wage
growth and inflation (Swiss indexation). Since the real wage growth is sup-
posed to be positive, this implies that the average of all pensions is smaller
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6 In Slovakia, pensions are not taxed, so comparison to the net wages may seem more appropri-
ate. However, such approach is in general not used, because of unpredictability of future tax poli-
cies.
7 law no. 43/2004, in effect since January 2005 (some provisions since February 2004)
8Average gross wage in thethird quarter 2003 was Sk14,066. Source: Statistical Office of theSlo-
vak Republic.than the average initial pension. Currently, the ratio of the average pension
to the average gross wage is approximately 40 %.9
The adopted pay-as-you-go pension formula is not sensitive to demographic
development. This is different for example in Poland, where the corres-
ponding formula contains the average life expectancy at the time of retire-
ment. However, we can not claim that the demography crisis will actually
not affect the pension system. Although demography was removed from
the formula, we have showed that it is an important factor in the balance of
the 1st pillar. Ignorance of demography thus contains political risks and that
in the future the indexation of the APV could be changed.
Other ways of controlling deficit is to increase the retirement age (e.g. to
65) or change indexation of pensions (e.g. to CPI indexation). The pension
formula sets the replacement rate at 25 % from the 1st pillar, while another
25 % is expected to come from the 2nd pillar. These rates serve as bench-
marks for all who are thinking about a switch: if the 2nd pillar will earn more
than 25 % replacement, then the switch is optimal.
However, 25% replacement of the1stpillar is unfair compared to the2ndpil-
lar, because thelatter does not create deficits to be covered by public finance.
The former, based on 62–62 retirement age, will lead to the deterioration of
the replacement rate (17 % in 2054 – Figure 9) and so will have to be sub-
sidized by public finance.
The law sets administrative costs of the 2nd pillar at 1 % of monthly con-
tributions and 0.07 % of the monthly asset value (i.e., 0.84 % p.a.). Admi-
nistrative costs are similar to Poland, where the usual charge on monthly
contributions is about 5–9 % (not regulated by law) and on monthly asset
value 0.05 % (0.6 % p.a.).
In our estimations, we use 9 % contributions to the 2nd pillar and admi-
nistrative costs. Wage growth estimations are depicted here in the table in
the Annex. We assume that a retired person buys an annuity for a pension
indexed by the level of interest rates. Using these assumptions, the initial
replacement rate (initial pension to the last gross wage) is S/(DW), where
Sstands for total savings, Dfor duration of receiving pensions (in years) and
W for the last (annual) gross wage.
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FIGURE 9 Average Replacement Rate of the 1st Pillar, Assuming Its Zero Deficit




































Average pension from the pay-as-you-go system
9 Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic.According to the medium option of the demographic scenario, the life ex-
pectancy of a person on reaching the age of 62 was 75 for men and 85 for
women in 2000. These figures are likely to increase in the next decades. In
our estimations we use 15 to 25 years long period of receiving pension. We
assume that saving starts in 2004 and will continue to be exempt from ta-
xes.
Finally, we assume three nominal levels of asset returns (minus adminis-
trative costs): 4 %, 6 % and 8 %. We estimate that for 8 % asset returns,
the 2nd pillar achieves the level of the 1st pillar (Table 2; the level of pension
from the 1st pillar is not higher than 50 % divided by 2, i.e. 25 %). Also, for
6%   returns, 2nd pillar achieves at least equal results as the 1st pillar. To
achieve a 50 % initial replacement rate, let us say that a person would have
to work for 40years. Thus, auniversity graduate would have to work at least
till 65. Currently, this implies a pension would be received on average for
15 years.
The pension level is very sensitive to the relation between nominal growth
of wages and asset returns. Therefore, we compute initial replacement rate
under three assumptions: that asset returns (minus the administration
costs) are equal to the nominal growth of wages +0 %, 1 % and 2 % (Table 3).
In most cases, performance of the 2nd pillar is as good as, or better than
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TABLE 2 Replacement Rates from the 2nd Pillar under Different Asset Returns
Note: Row labels denote number of years of paying contributions; column labels number of years of receiving pen-
sion.
Asset returns = 4 % Asset returns = 6 % Asset returns = 8 %
25 20 15 25 20 15 25 20 15
30 8.6 10.7 14.3 11.1 13.9 18.5 14.7 18.4 24.5
35 9.9 12.4 16.5 13.5 16.8 22.4 18.8 23.5 31.3
40 11.2 14.0 18.7 15.9 19.9 26.5 23.5 29.4 39.2
41 11.4 14.3 19.1 16.4 20.5 27.4 24.6 30.7 41.0
42 11.7 14.6 19.5 17.0 21.2 28.3 25.6 32.0 42.7
43 11.9 14.9 19.9 17.5 21.8 29.1 26.7 33.4 44.5
44 12.2 15.2 20.3 18.0 22.5 30.0 27.8 34.8 46.4
45 12.4 15.5 20.7 18.5 23.1 30.9 29.0 36.2 48.3
46 12.7 15.8 21.1 19.1 23.8 31.8 30.2 37.7 50.3
TABLE 3 Replacement Rates from the 2nd Pillar, Assuming Returns Equal Wage Growth + x %
Note: Row labels denote number of years of paying contributions; column labels number of years of receiving pen-
sion.
Asset returns = wage  Asset returns = wage Asset returns = wage
growth growth plus 1 % growth plus 2 %
25 20 15 25 20 15 25 20 15
30 10.7 13.4 17.8 12.3 15.4 20.5 14.2 17.8 23.7
35 12.5 15.6 20.8 14.7 18.4 24.5 17.5 21.8 29.1
40 14.3 17.8 23.8 17.2 21.6 28.7 21.1 26.3 35.1
41 14.6 18.3 24.4 17.8 22.2 29.6 21.8 27.3 36.4
42 15.0 18.7 25.0 18.3 22.9 30.5 22.6 28.2 37.6
43 15.3 19.2 25.5 18.8 23.5 31.4 23.4 29.2 38.9
44 15.7 19.6 26.1 19.4 24.2 32.3 24.2 30.2 40.3
45 16.0 20.1 26.7 19.9 24.9 33.2 25.0 31.2 41.6
46 16.4 20.5 27.3 20.4 25.6 34.1 25.8 32.3 43.0the performance of the 1st pillar. When growth of wages and asset returns
are equal, the result does not depend on the level of asset returns. For equal
growth rates of wages and returns, the resulting replacement ratios are also
equal.
The above calculations assume constant asset returns and no risk. Sup-
pose, however, that annual asset returns are normally distributed and re-
turn is equal to:
r=r e +  .Z
where re is the expected value of return, Z is a random variable with normal
distribution N(0,1), and   the standard deviation. Then we estimate returns
and calculate standard deviations from total returns (including dividends),
using the stock indices S&P500 (USA), FTSE (Great Britain), DAX (Ger-
many) and SPI (Switzerland) in January 1981 to June 2003 (Table 4).
We repeat the calculations of pension levels with the same parameters,
as in Table 3, and with probabilities of reaching particular pension levels,
when contributions were paid for 40 years and invested in S&P500, DAX
or SPI stock indices (FTSE has a similar average and standard deviation
as the S&P500 and therefore the results related to this index are skipped).
It is clear that investment to S&P500 (FTSE) and SPI will lead to the 2nd pil-
lar outperforming the 1st pillar (Table 5). However, investment in DAX
makes the achievement of a 25% replacement rate less likely (probabily
0.71 for 15 years of pension receipt and 0.54 for 20 years of pension re-
ceipt).
Bonds yield lower returns for their lower risk. We use yields of 10-year
government bonds (January 1996 – June 2002) emitted in Switzerland, USA,
Great Britain and Germany. Our estimates of average yields and standard
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TABLE 4 Returns and Standard Deviations of the Stock Indices, %
Index S&P500 FTSE DAX SPI
Return p.a. 13.29 13.47 9.53 10.97
Standard deviation p.a. 15.58 15.07 17.40 16.97
TABLE 5 Probabilistic Distribution of Pension Levels, Investment to Different Stock Indices
Note: Row labels denote initial replacement rate (ratio of the initial pension to last gross wage); column labels num-
ber of years of receiving pension.
S&P500 DAX SPI
%
25 20 15 25 20 15 25 20 15
10 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
20 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9
25 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9
30 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8
40 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6
50 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5
60 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4
70 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3
80 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
90 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2deviations are presented in Table 6. Neglecting currency risks (CHF, USD,
GBP, EUR), we estimate probabilistic distributions of pension levels corres-
ponding to selected bonds (Table 7). It is clear that a sufficient level of pen-
sion will not be achieved by investment in CHF bonds. Using the same as-
sumptions as for the estimation of returns on the stock indices, we conclude
that with the exception of GBP, there is only a small chance of outperform-
ing the 1st pillar.
Pension funds usually hold portfolios comprising of bonds and equities.
Limits for their weights in portfolio differs from country to country. In Slo-
vakia, each pension company will manage three funds: Growth Fund, Ba-
lanced Fund and Conservative fund, each with different limits for invest-
ment (Table 8). Savers may hold assets only in one fund at a time. Up to
15 years before retirement, the saver may not hold assets in the Growth
Fund and up to 7 years in the Balanced Fund, in order to decrease the risk
of the value of savings substantially falling shortly before retirement.10
From our estimations it is clear that the 2nd pillar (a combination of asset
and bond investment) is likely to outperform the 1st pillar.
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TABLE 8 Limits for Investment for the Pension Funds
Stocks Bonds and Money Market Instruments
Growth Fund up to 80 % no limit
Balanced Fund up to 50 % at least 50 %
Conservative Fund no stocks 100 %
TABLE 7 Probabilistic Distribution of Pension Levels, Investment to Different Bonds
Note: Row labels denote initial replacement rate (ratio of the initial pension to last gross wage); column labels
number of years of receiving pension.
USD government bonds GBP government bonds EUR government bonds
%
25 20 15 25 20 15 25 20 15
10 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
15 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.8 1.0
20 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.8
25 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.4
30 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1
35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
40 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE 6 Returns and Standard Deviations of Bonds, %
CHF USD GBP EUR(DEM)
average yield 3.95 6.12 8.24 6.38
standard deviation 5.20 6.90 6.45 5.66
10 For valuable analysis of several pension plans see (Blake, 2003).4. Conclusions
Apension reform was necessary if the country wanted to avoid high deficit
of the pay-as-you-go system and ensure decent level of pensions. The reform
contains three important steps: achange in indexation, anincrease of there-
tirement age and the launch of the funded pillar. The 2nd pillar will natu-
rally deepen the deficit in the first decades after its introduction, but as mo-
re people will start receiving pensions from the 2nd pillar, the deficit of
the 1st pillar will decline. The system, then, will be superior to the one pil-
lar system. Replacement of the Swiss indexation by the CPI indexation, and
an increase of the retirement age to e.g. 65 for men and women would fur-
ther decrease the deficit.
For the 2nd pillar to produce a decent level of pensions, a sufficient part of
contributions must be invested in stocks. Still, there is a considerable pro-
bability that the pure pay-as-you-go system would outperform the two pil-
lar system.
Finally, the adopted pay-as-you-go pension formula and targeted 25% re-
placement ratio will create a deficit, and thus a pressure on public finance.
This could cause political decisions to decrease the replacement target of
the first pillar. Therefore, when comparing the level of pensions from the pay-
-as-you-go and funded pillars one should bear in mind that thepensions from
the pay-as-you-go pillar are subject to a political risk.
ANNEX
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Year Gross wages (real) Inflation rate Unemployment rate GDP (real)
2004 0.9 7.6 15.2 1.9
2005 3.4 4.6 14.8 4.4
2006 4.0 3.5 14.4 5.5
2007 4.0 3.5 14.0 4.5
2008 4.0 3.5 13.6 4.5
2009 3.5 3.5 13.2 4.5
2010 3.5 3.5 12.8 4.5
2011 3.5 3.5 12.5 4.0
2012 3.5 3.5 12.2 4.0
2013 3.5 3.5 11.9 4.0
2014 3.5 3.5 11.6 4.0
2015 3.5 3.0 11.4 4.0
2016 3.5 3.0 11.2 4.0
2017 3.5 3.0 11.0 4.0
2018 3.5 3.0 10.8 4.0
2019 3.5 3.0 10.6 3.5
2020 3.5 3.0 10.3 3.5
2021 3.5 3.0 10.0 3.5
2022 3.5 2.5 9.5 3.5
2023 3.5 2.5 9.0 3.5
2024 3.5 2.5 8.5 3.5
2025–90 3.0 2.0 8.0 3.0
Source: Forecasts were provided by Martin Barto and Juraj Kotian.
Macroeconomic Forecasts (percentage growth)REFERENCES
BENCZÚR, P. (1999): Changes in the Implicit Debt Burden of the Hungarian Social Security.
National Bank of Hungary Working Paper, August 1999.
BLAKE, D. – CAIRNS, A. – DOWD, K. (2003): Pensionmetrics: Stochastic Pension Plan Design
and Value-At-Risk During the Accumulation Phase. Discussion paper. Gutmann Symposium on
Capital Market Based Pension Systems. Vienna, December 2003.
BLAKE, D. – CAIRNS, A. – DOWD, K. (2003): Pensionmetrics 2: Stochastic Pension Plan Design
DuringtheDistributionPhase.Discussion paper. Gutmann Symposium on Capital Market Based
Pension Systems. Vienna, December 2003.
BODIE, Z. (1994): On the Risk of Stocks in the Long Run. Harvard Business School Working Pa-
per, no. 95-013, December 1994.
BODIE, Z. (1996): What the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Can Learn from the Fede-
ral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 10,
no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 83–100.
BODIE, Z. (2001): Retirement Investing: A New Approach. Boston University School of Mana-
gement Working Paper, no. 2001-03, February 2001.
CHLON, A. – GÓRA, M. – RUTKOWSKI, M. (1999): Shaping Pension Reform in Poland: Secu-
rity Through Diversity.TheWorld Bank, SocialProtectionDiscussionPaperSeries, August 1999.
FULTZ, E. (ed.) (2002): Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Vol. I. Budapest, ILO,
2002.
GOLIA·, P. (2003): Pension Calculations for the PAYG and the Funded Pension System in Slo-
vakia. AcademiaIstropolitanaNova,ProfessionalProgrammeinAppliedEconomicsandFinance,
August 2003.
HOLZMANN, R. (1997): FiscalAlternativesofMovingfromUnfundedtoFundedPensions.OECD
Development Centre, Produced as part of the research program on Macroeconomic Interdepen-
dence and Capital Flows, August 1997.
INFOSTAT: Prognóza v˘voja obyvateºstva SR do roku 2050. Bratislava, Akty, 2002.
KOHOUT, P. (2001): Nûkteré chyby systému penzijních fondÛ v âR (Errors in the System of De-
fined-benefit Pension Funds in the CR. – in Czech only). Finance a úvûr, roã. 51, 2001, ã. 10,
ss. 542–566.
KREIDL, V. (1998): Penzijní reforma v âR. Finance a úvûr, roã. 48, 1998, ã. 1, ss. 36–54.
KREIDL, V. (1997): Reforma penzijního systému. Politická ekonomie, 1997, ã. 6, ss. 836–61.
M.E.S.A. 10 (2001): Anal˘za dôchodkového systému na Slovensku, Bratislava, 2001.
MPSVaR SR (2003): Návrh koncepcie reformy dôchodkového zabezpeãenia v SR. Bratislava,
bﬁezen 2003.
Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform (1997): Security Through
Diversity: Reform of the Pension System in Poland. Warsaw, 1997.
ORSZAG, P. R. – STIGLITZ, J. E. (2001): Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths about Social
Security System. Presented at the conference on New Ideas about Old Age Security. The World
Bank Washington, D.C., September 14–15, 1999.
PALACIOS, R. – ROCHA, R. (1998): The Hungarian Pension System in Transition. In: Bok-
ros, L. – Dethier, J. J. (eds.): Public Finance Reform during the Transition: The experience of
Hungary. The World Bank Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 177–216.
PI¡ERA, J. (1996): Empowering Workers: ThePrivatization of Social Security in Chile. Cato’sLet-
ter (Cato Institute, Washington), 1996, no. 10.
SIMONOVITS, A. (2000): Partial Privatization of a Pension System: Lessons from Hungary. In-
ternational Journal of Development, vol. 12, 2000, pp. 519–529.
THOMAY, M. – ·VEJNA, I. – ORAVEC, J. (2002): Koncepcia reformy dôchodkového systému.
Bratislava, The F. A. Hayek Foundation, June 2002.
TOMASZEWSKA, E. (1999): Pension System Reform in Poland. International Construction In-
stitute Pension Education, Research and Technical Assistance (PERTA) ILO Geneva, June 16,
1999.
403 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10SUMMARY
JEL classification: C15, E27, G11, G23
Keywords: pension reform – Slovakia – fiscal debt – pension level – asset returns – risk
Pension Reform in Slovakia:
Fiscal Debt and Pension Levels
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vakia (corresponding author: igor.melichercik@fmph.uniba.sk)
This paper considers two aspects of a recent pension reform in Slovakia: the fi-
nancial balance of the former pay-as-you-go system, and the level of retirement pen-
sions in a newly introduced two-pillar system. Generally, there are three important
steps to sustainable pension reform: a change of pension indexation, a raised re-
tirement age, and the launch of a fully funded (second) pillar. With regard to fiscal
debt, the two-pillar system is superior to the pay-as-you-go system in the long term.
Having considered the risk of returns on savings in the funded pillar, the authors
show that while pensions under the two-pillar system should be higher than under
ao ne-pillar system, it is not a certainty.
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